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Compared with the direct server-user approach, the server-proxy-user architecture for multimedia delivery promises significantly
improved system scalability. The introduction of the intermediary transcoding proxies between content servers and end users
in this architecture, however, brings unprecedented challenges to content security. In this article, we present a systematic
study on the end-to-end content authentication problem in the server-proxy-user context, where intermediary proxies transcode
multimedia content dynamically. We present a formal model for the authentication problem, propose a concrete construction for
authenticating generic data modality and formally prove its security. We then apply the generic construction to authenticating
specific multimedia formats, for example, JPEG2000 code-streams and MPEG-4 video streams. The prototype implementation
shows that our scheme is suitable for practical applications.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The server-proxy-user architecture, which incorporates intermediary transcoding proxies between mul-
timedia server and end users, is increasingly becoming accepted as a promising paradigm for multimedia
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Fig. 1. A server-proxy-user multimedia content delivery system.
content delivery. In the server-proxy-user system, as depicted in Figure 1, one or more intelligent inter-
mediary proxies reside along the path from a server that disseminates multimedia content to end users
who are content consumers. Each proxy serves a distinct group of users out of the entire user population
of the server and is entrusted by the multimedia server to perform certain transcoding operations upon
the content according to the end users’ specific capabilities, configurations, or preferences. For example,
a proxy downscales a high-quality image to a small thumbnail, in replying to a user request from a
handheld device with limited processing and display capabilities. In many cases, multimedia content
may pass several proxies and undergo multiple kinds of transcoding operations before reaching the end
users.
A major advantage of the proxy-enabled multimedia delivery system is its scalability. In a traditional
server-user system, the server inevitably becomes the system bottleneck as the size of user population
increases. The introduction of intermediary proxies in the server-proxy-user systems solves this problem
by amortizing the processing of user requests from a single server to multiple proxies, which not only
relieves the server from intense data processing, but also shortens the request response time due to
caching of content at the proxies [Bhattacharjee et al. 1998; Cardellini et al. 2000; Li and Shen 2005;
Shen et al. 2003; Smith et al. 1998].
As consumption of multimedia content becomes increasingly routine in our daily lives, server-proxy-
user multimedia delivery systems have many applications. The following are some examples, among
numerous others.
1.1 Application Scenarios
1.1.1 Dynamic Content Adaption in Pervasive Computing. As pervasive computing is increasingly
becoming a reality, there is a growing need to adapt multimedia content delivery to a variety of client
devices of varying computational and storage capacities, screen sizes and bandwidth connections. The
traditional solution to content adaption is to have the multimedia server either transform the multime-
dia content on the fly or generate every possible version in advance and deliver the appropriate version
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based on users’ requests. Neither method, however, is satisfactory as they make the server heavily in-
volved in computation or storage. Many proposals, for example, Bjork and Christopoulos [2000], Huang
et al. [2004], Libsie and Kosch [2002], Ooi and van Renesse [2001], and Yeung et al. [2002], suggested
using server-proxy-user systems to improve performance: the server entrusts intermediary proxies to
dynamically transcode multimedia content based on the specific user constraints. Transcoding opera-
tions in these kinds of applications are typically content downscaling: multimedia streams originated
from the multimedia server are normally the highest in quality and the richest in content; the inter-
mediary proxies downgrade the quality of the streams by removing certain content items in order to fit
the particular competence of client devices.
1.1.2 Multimedia Composition. Multimedia composition systems, for example, Li et al. [2005],
Wagner and Kellerer [2004], and Yamaoka et al. [2005], are a special instance of the server-proxy-
user multimedia delivery architecuture, where the intermediary proxies are required to transcode and
syndicate multiple multimedia-related streams from the multimedia server (or from different servers)
into a single stream, before sending the composite stream to end users. An example is that the multime-
dia server sends separate data modalities to the transcoding proxies: video, audio, and text; according to
the users preferences, the proxies translate the text into a user-preferred language, and then combine
the video content, the audio content, and the text together into a composite stream. Typical transcoding
operations in the multimedia composition applications involve not only content downscaling but also
content alteration: changing a part of the original multimedia content.
1.1.3 Tiered Multimedia Distribution Systems. Another class of applications that follow the server-
proxy-user model is tiered multimedia distribution systems [Suzuki et al. 2004; Yuuichi et al. 2003].
Such a system consists of a top-tier primary content provider and a number of lower-tier affiliating
providers each with its own users. An example is a multinational company that has a number of
affiliated vendors worldwide; to promote a new product, the company produces a video advertisement
for the product and delivers it to all the affiliated vendors; in order to better fit the local market, each
affiliated vendor is entitled to derive its own local version (such as adding subtitles in the local language)
based on the original advertisement. In scenarios like this, a lower-tier content provider may perform
transcoding operations such as content downscaling, content alteration, and content insertion: adding
new data to the original content.
Copyright protection may also be a motivation for transcoding by the lower-tier content providers in
tiered multimedia distribution systems. For example, the primary content provider sends multimedia
content to the affiliated lower-tier providers which then sell content to end users. Before delivering
the content to a user, the affiliated provider transcodes the content by embedding a user-specific mark
into the content in an attempt to trace pirated copies [Guo and Georganas 2002; Kirovski et al. 2002;
Schonberg and Kirovski 2004; Schlauweg et al. 2006].
1.1.4 Transcoding Proxy for Medical Images. Halle and Kikinis [2004], Mohammed and Fiaidhi
[2005], and Parmanto et al. [2005] described server-proxy-user delivery systems for images. Because
of the very nature of medical applications, images need to present various modalities to meet different
requirements of doctors and medical procedures. For example, one surgeon may require a 3D volume
of a medical image while another may demand a series of 2D slices of the same image. As modal-
ity transformation for medical images is common, the server-proxy-user multimedia delivery systems
particularly suit medical scenarios. Another important factor that justifies the use of proxy-enabled
systems for medical imaging systems is the increasing deployment of wireless services in healthcare
environments. Transcoding operations for medical images include format conversion, for example, from
GIF to JPEG, and structural changes to the presentation format [Mohammed and Fiaidhi 2005].
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While the server-proxy-user architecture has been accepted as a scalable new paradigm for multime-
dia content delivery, we notice however that security issues in such systems have not been rigorously
explored and many of the existing studies have certain limitations (see Section 2 for details). In critical
fields such as government, finance, health care, and the law, it is crucial and often a requirement to
ensure end users of the authenticity of the content they received. Many data authentication techniques,
such as MAC (Message Authentication Code) and digital signature, have been proposed in the litera-
ture. However these techniques completely ignore the internal structure of the underlying data, and
thus are not efficient when applied to multimedia content.
1.2 Our Contributions
Our focus in this article is achieving end-to-end authentication from the multimedia server to end
users in the presence of intermediary transcoding proxies. As we have demonstrated earlier, content
transcoding is inevitable and beneficial in server-proxy-user multimedia delivery systems. However,
such transcoding would definitely invalidate the integrity-checking data (or authentication data) upon
the content generated by the multimedia server if standard techniques such as digital signature or MAC
are used. The challenge is thus to enable content transcoding by the proxies while without disabling
the authentication data generated by the server. It should be clear that sustaining and verifying the
intactness of the original content is not the objective in this context; instead, authentication relates
to entitling the end users to verify origin of data as well as authorized data alteration. In particular,
we systematically study the authentication problem in the proxy-enabled multimedia delivery systems
with the following specific contributions.
—We present a formal system model for the end-to-end authentication problem in server-proxy-user
multimedia delivery systems.
—We propose a concrete construction for end-to-end authentication of generic data content based on
the Merkle hash tree [Merkle 1989] and sanitizable signatures [Ateniese et al. 2005]. The Merkle
hash tree allows for efficient verification of a subset of data given a signature upon the whole set.
A sanitizable signature allows authorized semi-trusted proxies to modify parts of a signed message
without interacting with the original signer. The main difference between our construction and the
sanitizable signature [Ateniese et al. 2005] is that the latter allows for content alteration only while
the former supports all of the aforementioned transcoding operations. Moreover, our construction is
designed for end-to-end content authentication in the server-proxy-user multimedia delivery systems.
We also provide a formal proof on the security of the proposed construction.
—We apply and optimize our schemes for authentication of JPEG2000 code-streams and MPEG-4 video
streams. We remark that the cryptographic primitives proposed in Johnson et al. [2002], Miyazaki
et al. [2006], and Steinfeld et al. [2001], while not explicitly designed for authentication of multime-
dia content, are applicable to server-proxy-user multimedia delivery systems, but can only address
content downscaling.
1.3 Article Organization
We review related work in Section 2. In Section 3, we propose a formal system model for the end-to-end
authentication problem in the server-proxy-user multimedia delivery systems. Section 4 presents our
concrete construction under the proposed model by considering generic data modality, together with its
security analysis. We then apply and tailor the generic scheme to authenticating specific multimedia
formats such as JPEG2000 code-streams and MPEG-4 video streams in Section 5. Implementation
results are presented in Section 6, and Section 7 concludes the article.
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2. RELATED WORK
Our work directly relates to multimedia authentication using cryptographic techniques, which in our
taxonomy is categorized into two classes: multimedia authentication in the server-user systems and in
the server-proxy-user systems, and as we shall see shortly, the two have quite different focuses. Digital
watermarking has also been used for the purposes of multimedia authentication (e.g., Schneider and
Chang [1996], Lin and Chang [2001], Fridrich et al. [2004], and Swaminathan et al. [2006]), but it cannot
protect the whole content of the underlying data and must sacrifice a small portion of the content for
watermark embedding. This differs significantly from authentication using cryptography, and thus is
outside the scope of our discussion. Other related efforts include Guo and Georganas [2002], Kirovski
et al. [2002], and Schonberg and Kirovski [2004], which deal with Digital Right Management, and Deng
et al. [2004], Furht and Kirovski [2006], Liu and Eskicioglu [2003], Shi and Bhargava [1998], and Yeung
et al. [2002], which concern protecting confidentiality of multimedia content.
2.1 Multimedia Authentication in Server-User Systems
The focus of authentication in server-user systems is to efficiently authenticate multicast multimedia
streams in the presence of lossy dissemination channels. A number of papers examined solutions to
this problem using either secret key-only operations [Briscoe 2000; Bergadano et al. 2000; Perrig 2001;
Perrig et al. 2000, 2001] or asymmetric cryptographic techniques [Golle and Modadugu 2001; Krohn
et al. 2004; Lysyanskaya et al. 2004b; Miner and Staddon 2001; Park et al. 2003; Pannetrat and Molva
2003; Rohatgi 1999]. The basic rationale of the secret key-only approach is delayed disclosure of the
symmetric keys by the multimedia server to the users so as to provide source authentication (the
received content indeed originates from the source and has not been modified enroute). Taking TESLA
[Perrig et al. 2000] for example, the multimedia server sends out a packet together with its MAC
computed using a secret key k known only to itself; upon reception of a packet, a user buffers the packet
without being able to immediately authenticate it; after a reasonably short period of time, the server
discloses k to enable users to authenticate the packet(s) whose MAC is computed with k. The advantage
of the secret key-only approach is efficiency, but it cannot achieve nonrepudiation—the users are unable
to convince a third party that the received content came from the designated source.
Using digital signature solves the nonrepudiation problem, which leads to the asymmetric cryptogra-
phy based approach. However, asymmetric cryptographic operations are expensive, the main objective
of the asymmetric cryptography based approach is thus to amortize asymmetric operations over several
packets or data blocks. For example, Rohatgi [1999] uses reduced-size online/offline k-time signatures,
Golle and Modadugu [2001] adopt a tree-based method and Miner and Staddon [2001] follow a graph-
based method to reduce authentication overhead. Krohn et al. [2004], Lysyanskaya et al. [2004b], Park
et al. [2003], and Pannetrat and Molva [2003] in addition employ error correcting codes such as erasure
coding, to strengthen authentication.
Regardless of secret key-only approaches and asymmetric cryptography-based approaches, authen-
tication in server-user systems essentially deals with authenticating multimedia streams when they
suffer from stochastic packet losses during transmission. In other words, data manipulation suffered in
these systems is in an uncontrolled manner. In comparison, server-proxy-user systems have a quite dif-
ferent scenario to consider: data transcoding is performed in a controlled manner from the perspective
of the multimedia server. As a consequence, the methods for the server-user systems are not directly
applicable to the server-proxy-user systems.
2.2 Multimedia Authentication in Server-Proxy-User Systems
We are not the first to study the authentication problem in server-proxy-user systems; there are several
prior works. Deng et al. [2005, 2004], Gentry et al. [2005], Peng et al. [2003], and Wu and Deng [2006]
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propose using the hash chain or the Merkle hash tree to achieve authentication of multimedia con-
tent, while allowing for content, downscaling transcoding by the intermediary proxies. The basic idea
is that the multimedia server signs a single piece of authentication data derived from the underlying
multimedia content by organizing the content into a chain or a Merkle hash tree, and this signature
is still verifiable given a portion of the content together with some auxiliary authentication informa-
tion related to the missing parts. In particular, the methods in Gentry et al. [2005] consider generic
multimedia content by treating the content as a set of data packets, while Deng et al. [2005, 2004],
Peng et al. [2003], and Wu and Deng [2006] propose solutions to specific multimedia modalities such
as JPEG2000 images and MPEG-4 video streams. While of high efficiency, these proposals only handle
content downscaling, but not other transcoding operations such as content alteration.
An authentication solution to composition of MPEG-4 video streams by the intermediary proxies
is presented in Li et al. [2005], where the multimedia server signs the original multimedia streams
prior to dissemination, and the intermediary proxies en route sign the parts they modified and then
combine the previous signatures and the current signature into an aggregate signature [Lysyanskaya
et al. 2004a]. The final resulting aggregate signature enables verification of all the signatures that have
been aggregated. A clear advantage of aggregate signature is space efficiency, but it loses locality, it
is not possible to pinpoint the parts that invalidate the final aggregate signature given that certain
streams experienced illegitimate manipulations en route. In our construction, we can choose to offer
locality to the parts that are expected to be altered.
The work most related to ours is Suzuki et al. [2004], which also considers achieving end-to-end
authentication of multimedia content while accommodating transcoding operations by the intermediary
proxies. The method they employ is that the multimedia server issues a signature upon the hash value
of the underlying multimedia content, which is computed by applying a trapdoor hash function; the
proxy knowing the secret trapdoor can find a collision of the hash value. Unfortunately, the trapdoor
hash function they use has a serious weakness: publishing different transcoding results of the same
multimedia content reveals the secret trapdoor, which means the intermediary proxy can only generate a
single version of transcoded content. This clearly limits the use of their method in practice. In contrast,
our construction entitles an intermediary proxy for unlimited times of transcodings by utilizing the
trapdoor hash function used to generate sanitizable signatures [Ateniese et al. 2005]. Moreover, we
consider not only generic multimedia data, but also specific multimedia formats such as JPEG2000
code-streams and MPEG-4 video streams; we also give a formal model for the end-to-end authentication
problem.
3. FORMAL SYSTEM MODEL
Participants in a server-proxy-user multimedia delivery system include a multimedia server, a group of
users, and one or several intermediary proxies located between the server and the users. The multimedia
server is the originator of the multimedia content, a proxy is authorized by the multimedia server to
perform certain transcoding operations on the content it receives, and users are the ultimate consumers
of the content. The proxies are semi-trusted in the sense that they transcode a content in a prescribed
way, for example, to meet the constraints of the users’ devices. Informally, authentication in the server-
proxy-user multimedia delivery systems is to enable users to verify the originality of the content, and
to verify that content transcoding has been performed by the authorized intermediary proxies (formal
definition will be summarized in the form of security requirements). We stress that authentication in
our model must be enabled in the presence of the following transcoding operations.
—Content downscaling. The multimedia server authorizes an intermediary proxy to drop some portions
of the content. Normally, content downscaling performed by the proxy is to harmlessly downgrade
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the quality of the multimedia content in order to fit the end users’ devices. Of course, a malicious
proxy or an attacker can always make the content unrenderable to the users’ devices by dropping the
core portions of the content, for example, dropping the R0 subband in an JPEG2000 code-stream (see
Section 5.1 for the introduction of the JPEG2000 code-stream). Such an attack constitutes a type of
denial of service attack and is beyond the scope of this article.
—Content alteration. The multimedia server authorizes an intermediary proxy to modify certain des-
ignated parts of the content.
—Content insertion. The multimedia server authorizes an intermediary proxy to insert new content
at designated locations of the content. In our construction, the multimedia server inserts blank data
holders at the locations where the intermediary proxy is expected to insert new content; subsequently,
the proxy replaces the blank data with the content it wishes to insert. As a result, content insertion
is reduced to content alteration, and we do not explicitly distinguish them.
3.1 The Model
Our end-to-end authentication scheme for the server-proxy-user multimedia delivery systems consists
of four efficient algorithms for key generation, signing, transcoding, and verification, respectively.
Key Generation. The key generation algorithm KeyGen is a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm
that takes as input the security parameter 1k , and outputs key pairs for the multimedia server and
each intermediary proxy.
(PKS , SKS ; {PKPi , SKPi }i) =: KeyGen(1k),
where (PKS , SKS) is the key pair for the multimedia server to sign the original content, and (PKPi ,
SKPi ) is the key pair for proxy i, used for transcoding. The former can be a key pair for any standard
signature scheme while the latter can be a key pair for any digital signature scheme or any public key
encryption scheme. The key generation algorithm may be invoked by a trusted third party (e.g., CA,
certificate authority) in a preprocessing step.
Signing. The signing algorithm Sign takes as input a multimedia content m, the private key of the
multimedia server SKS , the set of public keys {PKPi }i of the proxies, and random coins r, and outputs
a digital signature σ .
σ =: Sign(m, r, {PKPi }i, SKS).
The signing algorithm is performed by the multimedia server to produce a signature on the multimedia
content to be disseminated.
Transcoding. The trancoding algorithm Transcode takes as input a multimedia content m,1 the sig-
nature σ on m, the random r, the public key of the server PKS , and the private key, SKPi ; of proxy i
which performs transcoding. It outputs a transcoded content m′, random coins r ′, and possibly auxiliary
authentication information AAI .
(m′, r ′, AAI) =: Transcode(m, σ, r, PKS , SKPi ).
The presence of the auxiliary authentication information AAI is due to content downscaling. If there
is no content downscaling, AAI will be nil: AAI = φ. The transcoding algorithm is performed by the
intermediary proxy.
1m is not necessarily the original content from the multimedia server, and could be transcoded content from other proxies.
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Verification. The verification algorithm Verify is a deterministic algorithm with output over {0, 1}.
It takes as input a multimedia content m¯, a signature σ¯ on m¯, random coins r¯, the public key of the
server PKS , the set of public keys {PKPi }i of the proxies , and AAI if any, and outputs either 0 or 1.
{0, 1} =: Verify(m¯, σ¯ , r¯, AAI , {PKPi }i, PKS).
The verification algorithm can be performed by anyone.
3.2 Security Requirements
This authentication scheme must satisfy the following security requirements.
Correctness. A signature generated by the signing algorithm should be accepted by the verification
algorithm.
∀ σ = Sign(m, r, {PKPi }i, SKS) ⇒
Verify(m, σ, r, AAI = φ, {PKPi }i, PKS) = 1.
Security. Informally, without the knowledge of the private signing key, it is computationally infeasible
to generate a valid signature on a content under the corresponding public key, unless the content is a
transcoded content from a legitimate transcoding. We next give a definition on legitimacy of transcoding.
Definition 1. Legitimate transcoding. Without loss of generality, let us suppose m is a set of n ele-
ments, m = {m1, m2, . . . , mn}, and we consider a particular proxy with key pair (PKP , SKP ). (m′, r ′, AAI)
= Transcode (m, σ, r, PKS , SKP ) is a legitimate transcoding of m with respect to σ if one of the following
conditions holds:
C1 m′ ⊆ m; or
C2 σ = Sign(m′, r ′, PKP , SKS) in case AAI = φ; or
C3 Verify(m′, σ, r ′, AAI, PKP , PKS) = 1 in other cases.
We shall provide some clarification on this definition. C1 states that transcoding that only involves
content downscaling (resulting in m′ ⊆ m) is trivially legitimate and we call m′ a trivial transcoding
content of m. The reason that justifies this is that authentication in the context of server-proxy-server
systems is to verify data origin and is not to verify data intactness or completeness. C2 states that if
content downscaling is not involved (AAI = φ), a legitimate transcoding makes the original signature
σ exactly the signature on the transcoded content m′ using random coins r ′. C3 covers all other cases,
where the only way to determine a legitimate transcoding is to check the verification algorithm. We call
m′ in C2 and C3 a nontrivial transcoding content of m. Note that C3 has already covered C1 and C2, but
transcoding in C1 and C2 yields special structures, so we explicitly list them as separate conditions.
Formally, we formulate the security property as an adversarial game given in the following.
Definition 2. Secure End-to-end Multimedia Authentication Scheme. Algorithms (KeyGen, Sign,
Transcode, Verify) constitute a secure end-to-end multimedia authentication scheme if the advantage
of any probabilistic polynomial-time adversary A in the following game is negligible (with respect to
the security parameter k):
(1) A key pair (PKS , SKS) for signing and a key pair (PKP , SKP ) for transcoding are generated:
(PKS , SKS ; PKP , SKP ) =: KeyGen(1k).
(2) The adversary A is given:
—the public keys PKS and PKP as inputs;
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—the first phase of oracle access to Sign algorithm and Transcode algorithm, respectively; that is,
A is free to query OSKS and OSKP ;
(3) At the end of the first phase of the game, A outputs a message m and a state that represents the
knowledge acquired during this phase.
(4) A continues with the second phase of oracle queries to OSKS and OSKP , under the restrictions that
the total number of queries issued to OSKS is less than Q S , and to OSKP is less than Q P during the
two phases of oracle accesses, where Q S and Q P are the maximum number of queries allowed to
the corresponding oracles, depending on the security parameter.
(5) Last, A outputs a signature σ on m, together with the corresponding random r and AAI .
AdversaryAwins the game (breaking the security of the authentication scheme) if all of the following
conditions are met:
—Verify(m, σ, r, AAI, PKP , PKS) = 1;
—m is never queried to OSKS and OSKP ;
—m is not a trivial transcoded content of any message queried to OSKS and OSKP during the game.
The advantage of A is the probability that A wins the game, which is computed over the random
coins generated by A.
To keep our notations simply, we focus in the sequel, on the single proxy model in our discussion.
4. OUR CONSTRUCTION
In this section, we give a concrete construction of the end-to-end authentication scheme satisfying the
preceding security requirements. We first review the idea of sanitizable signatures [Ateniese et al.
2005], which we exploit in our construction. We then present a scheme for authentication of generic
multimedia content, and formally analyze its security.
4.1 Sanitizable Signatures
We only review the basic idea of sanitizable signatures [Ateniese et al. 2005], which suffices in under-
standing our scheme. To generate a sanitizable signature on a message, a trapdoor hash function is first
applied to the message, and then the resulting hash value is signed by a digital signature algorithm
such as RSA.
An example trapdoor hash function is the following. Let p be a prime such that p = 2q +1, where q is
also a prime, and g be a generator of the subgroup of squares in Z ∗p of order q. Let ( y = g x mod p, x)
be an Elgamal-type key pair where x is the private key serving as the secret trapdoor. Let H() be a
standard collision resistant hash function. The trapdoor hash function on message m under the public
key y is defined as THy (m, r) = (ρ−( ye g δ mod p)) mod q, where r = (ρ , δ) with ρ ∈R Z ∗p and δ ∈R Zq ,
and e = H(m, ρ).
Given a hash value v = THy (m, r), only the party that knows the secret trapdoor x can compute
a collision as follows: first it chooses a random value k′ ∈ Z ∗q ; then computes ρ ′ = (v + (gk
′
mod p))
mod q, e′ = H(m′, ρ ′) and δ′ = k′ − e′x (mod q). It is easy to see that (m′, r ′) = (m′, ρ ′, δ′) is a collision of
(m, r). It has been shown that finding a collision without knowledge of the secret trapdoor is reduced
to the forgery of the twin Nyberg-Rueppel signature [Naccache et al. 2001]. A particularly desirable
feature of this trapdoor hash function we desire, is that revelation of multiple collisions does not disclose
the secret trapdoor.
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We shall use this trapdoor hash function in the following construction. Note that in principle, our
construction can use any hash function that can find collisions with the help of certain secret informa-
tion. An example is the fourth variant of the VSH [Contini et al. 2006]. However, it seems that the VSH
is not as efficient as the previous trapdoor hash function, since it uses a large composite as modulus.
We also notice that the sibling intractable hash [Zheng et al. 1991] is not suitable to our construction,
as it cannot provide unlimited number of collisions, and the collisions must be predetermined by who
for an sets up the function.
4.2 The Scheme
4.2.1 Basic Construction. We consider generic data modality: the multimedia content m to be dis-
patched by the multimedia server is a data set consisting of n elements, m = {m1, m2, . . . , mn}. At a
very high level, our scheme works as follows. The multimedia server (1) inserts blank items at the
places where the intermediary proxy is permitted to insert new content; (2) hashes each of the blank
items and the items that the proxy is authorized to alter using the above trapdoor hash function under
the public key of the intermediary proxy, and hashes each of the remaining items using a standard
cryptographic hash function; (3) signs the concatenation of the hash values; and finally distributes all
the items along with the signature to the intermediary proxy. With the knowledge of the secret trapdoor,
the intermediary proxy is enabled to perform the expected transcoding operations on the items hashed
using the trapdoor hash function. We next detail the scheme.
Let (PKS , SKS) be the key pair of the server for signing and (PKPi , SKPi ) be the key pair of proxy
i for transcoding. Let H() be a standard collision resistant hash function modelled as random oracle
[Bellare and Rogaway 1993], and THPKPi
() be the trapdoor hash function under PKPi (SKPi is thus the
trapdoor). Without loss of generality, we assume the multimedia server inserts a blank item, blk, at
the end of the data set so as to enable proxy i to append additional content at the end of the original
multimedia content: mn+1 = blk. Further we assume that the server expects the proxy i to modify l
items of the data set, m j1 , m j2 , . . . , m jl .
Signing. In the signing algorithm, the multimedia server computes:
σ = Sign(m, r, {PKP }i, SKS)
= SSKS (I Dm||{PKPi }i||h1, . . . , hn, hn+1),
where SSKS () is the signing function of a digital signature scheme using the private signing key SKS , I Dm
is the identifier of the multimedia content m, h j = THPKPi (I Dm||m j , r j ) for j ∈ { j1, j2, . . . , jl , n + 1},
and h j = H(I Dm||m j ) if m j is expected not to be altered by any proxy. The multimedia server then
dispatches {m1, m2, . . . , mn+1}, σ , and r = (r j1 , r j2 , . . . , r jl , rn+1) to the proxies.
Transcoding by proxy i. Let m′j denote the transcoded content of m j , j ∈ { j1, j2, . . . , jl , n + 1}. As
the intermediary proxy i knows the private key SKPi that corresponds to PKPi , it can compute r
′
j
such that THPKPi
(I Dm||m′j , r ′j ) = THPKPi (I Dm||m j , r j ), j ∈ { j1, j2, . . . , jl , n + 1}. We assume that the
intermediary proxy performs content downscaling by removing md1 , md2 , . . . , mdt from the original data
set. We further assume that each removed item, md /∈ {m′j1 , m′j2 , . . . , m′jl , m′n+1} for d ∈ {d1, d2, . . . , dt}.
We use m′ to denote the transcoded content of m after these transcoding operations. The intermediary
proxy computes:
(m′, r ′, AAI) = Transcode(m, σ, r, PKS , SKPi ),
where r ′ = (r ′j1 , r ′j2 , . . . , r ′jl , r ′n+1), and AAI = {hd1 , hd2 , . . . , hdt }. The proxy forwards m′, σ , r ′ together
with AAI to the next proxy or end users. Subsequent proxies transcode in a similar way.
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Fig. 2. Organizing hash values into a Merkle hash tree.
Verification. Upon reception of m¯, σ¯ , r¯, and AAI, it is straightforward for a user to execute
Verify(m¯, σ¯ , r¯, AAI, {PKPi }i, PKS): it first computes and concatenates the hash values in the same man-
ner as in the signing algorithm. Let h¯ denote the concatenated value; it then outputs VPKS (h¯, σ¯ ), where
VPKS (.) is the verification function of the digital signature scheme using PKS .
In this basic scheme, the size of the auxiliary authentication information AAI is proportional to
the number of removed items. The AAI can be minimized by employing the Merkle hash tree, as
demonstrated in the following.
4.2.2 Optimization. In the signing algorithm, instead of directly signing the concatenation of the
hash values, the multimedia server organizes the hash values into a Merkle hash tree [Merkle 1989],
as depicted in Figure 2. Specifically, the leaf nodes of the tree are the set of the hash values to be
signed; the value of each internal node is derived from its child nodes under a hash function (we can
use the same hash function H(.)). Referring to Figure 2, we have h12 = H(h1, h2), h34 = H(h3, h4), and
h1234 = H(h12, h34), and so on. Finally, a unique root value h is obtained. The multimedia server then
generates a signature on h, σ = SSKS (I Dm||PKP ||h).
Suppose m1, m2, m3, and m4 are removed in the subsequent transcoding operation, it suffices for
the intermediary proxy to attach AAI = {h1234} to the original signature to assist the end user in
verification. Comparing AAI = {h1234} to AAI = {h1, h2, h3, h4} in the basic scheme, we see a significant
reduction in the amount of auxiliary authentication information. As content downscaling is probably the
most common operation in the server-proxy-user systems, the optimized scheme significantly reduces
authentication overhead, as we will demonstrate more clearly in the next section.
4.2.3 Security Analysis. We only analyze security of the basic scheme as security of the optimized
scheme is evident given the security of the basic scheme. It should also be clear that computing the
values of some of the internal nodes using the trapdoor hash function does not compromise the security
either.
Our construction trivially satisfies the correctness requirement, as we employ a standard digital signa-
ture scheme for signing. We thus focus on the security requirement. We call a probabilistic polynomial-
time adversary a (k, Q S , Q P , t, ε)-breaker of our construction if the adversary makes at most Q S
queries to the signing algorithm and at most Q P queries to the transcoding algorithm (QTH queries
to the oracle of the trapdoor hash function and Q H queries to the random oracle for the standard
hash function, such that Q P = QTH + Q H ), runs in at most t steps, and has an advantage of no less
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than ε (with respect to size k) in winning the game described in Section 3.2. We have the following
theorem:
THEOREM 1. Let A be a (k, Q S, Q P , t, ε)-breaker of our construction, then there exists a (k, Q S, t0,
ε0)-breaker of the underlying digital signature scheme, a (k, QTH, t1, ε1)-breaker of the trapdoor hash
function, or the regular hash function, that satisfy:
ε0 + ε1 ≥ ε
t0 ≤ t + QTH.tTH + Q H .tH
t1 ≤ t + Q S .tsign,
where tTH is the running time for computing a collision of the trapdoor hash function, tH is the running
time of the hash function, and tsign is the running time of the signing function of the digital signature
scheme, all on an instance of size k.
The proof of the theorem is a reductionist proof—the security property of our construction is reduced
to the security of the underlying digital signature scheme, the trapdoor hash function, or the regular
hash function. More specifically, if there exists an attacker A that breaks the security property of our
construction (wins the game specified in Section 3.2), then another attacker invoking A can break
the underlying digital signature scheme, the trapdoor hash function, or the regular hash function.
This leads to a contradiction, since the security of the latter has already been well established. For
conciseness of presentation, we leave the detailed proof to the Appendix.
4.2.4 Discussions. We next discuss some extensions to this construction.
Provision of Locality. This construction does not provide locality—in the case that the verification
algorithm outputs 0, it is not possible to pinpoint the items that caused the failure. We can choose to
provide locality to the items to be altered, but at the price of slightly more communication overhead. For
this purpose, we need an extra auxiliary authentication information AAIextra, which contains the hash
values generated by the trapdoor hash function; in the verification algorithm, each received (m¯ j , r¯ j ),
j ∈ { j1, j2, . . . , jl , n + 1}, is first used to compute a hash value under the trapdoor hash function. The
newly computed hash value is then compared with the corresponding hash value in AAIextra; the ones
that do not match indicate the location of authentication failure.
Against Lossy Channels. It appears not difficult to incorporate the techniques used to counter against
lossy channels such as Pannetrat and Molva [2003], Krohn et al. [2004], and Lysyanskaya et al. [2004b]
into our construction. What deserves mentioning here is that along the lossy channel in a server-proxy-
user system, there are two consecutive segments: one from the multimedia server to the intermediary
proxy, and the other from the proxy to end users. As a result, measures must be taken at both segments
in an attempt to counter the lossy channel. In particular, the multimedia server enforces the adopted
anti-lossy channel mechanism first and disseminates the content to the intermediary proxy; upon
receiving the content, the proxy decodes and verifies the content, and then reinforces the mechanism
and continues to transmit the content to end users.
Enforcing Data Confidentiality. Data confidentiality is another important security issue in the server-
proxy-user multimedia delivery systems. In this context, data confidentiality refers to keeping data
hidden from eavesdroppers en route during transmission. We next describe an encryption technique
that integrates naturally into our authentication scheme.
We require that the key pair of the intermediary proxy be for public key encryption. Moreover, each
user also has a key pair for public key encryption. Instead of sending out the multimedia content in the
clear, the multimedia server generates a random session key, encrypts the content using a symmetric
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encryption scheme under the session key, and encrypts the session key under the public key of the
intermediary proxy. Then the server dispatches all the ciphertexts together with its signature σ and r,
to the intermediary proxy. With the private key for transcoding, the intermediary proxy first decrypts
to get the session key, and then decrypts to obtain the multimedia content using the session key. The
proxy continues to transcode the multimedia content as usual. Finally, the proxy generates a new
session key, encrypts the transcoded content using the new session key, and encrypts the session key
under the user’s public key. At the user side, the user proceeds with decryptions in a similar way as the
intermediary proxy.
5. APPLICATION
Unlike generic data modality, actual multimedia content are rich in structures and have semantics,
which can be explored to achieve better efficiency. In this section, we apply our construction to authen-
ticating JPEG2000 code-streams and MPEG-4 video streams based on their respective semantics and
data structures.
5.1 Authentication of JPEG2000 Code-Streams
5.1.1 Fundamentals on JPEG2000. We first briefly introduce the concepts related to the semantics
of JPEG2000 code-streams [Taubman and Marcellin 2000; Deng et al. 2005, 2004].
Tile. A JPEG2000 image can be divided into rectangular nonoverlapping regions each of which is a
tile. Tiles of an image are compressed independently, so it suffices for us to consider a single tile in the
sequel.
Component. An image is comprised of one or more components. For example, an RGB image has
three components, representing red, green, and blue color planes.
Resolution-increment and resolution. Given a component, an (nR − 1)-level dyadic wavelet trans-
form is performed. The first level of transform wavelet decomposes the component into four frequency
subbands: LL1 (horizontally lowpass and vertically lowpass), LH1 (horizontally lowpass and vertically
highpass), HL1 (horizontally highpass and vertically lowpass) and H H1 (horizontally highpass and
vertically highpass). The second level of transform further decomposes LL1 into another four sub-
bands: LL2, LH2, HL2, and H H2. Eventually the (nR − 1) level of transform decomposes LLnR−2 into
LLnR−1, LHnR−1, HLnR−1, and H HnR−1. As a consequence, an (nR − 1)-level wavelet transform ends
up generating nR sets of subbands, denoted as R0 = LLnR−1, R1 = {LHnR−1, HLnR−1, H HnR−1}, . . . ,
RnR−1 = {LH1, HL1, H H1}. We refer to Ri as resolution-increment i. These nR resolution-increments
correspond to nR resolutions or image sizes. In particular, the resolution 0 image is constructed from
resolution-increment 0: R0; the resolution 1 image is constructed from R0 and R1; the resolution nR −1
image is constructed from all the resolution-increments: R0, R1, . . . , RnR−1. It should be noted that the
resolution nR − 1 image is the original image, and the resolution 0 image is the smallest thumbnail of
the image.
Layer-increment and layer. Following the wavelet decomposition, wavelet coefficients are quantized
and each quantized subband is partitioned into small rectangular blocks, referred to as code-blocks.
Each code-block is independently entropy encoded to create a compressed bit-stream that is distributed
across nL quality layers. Layers determine quality or signal-to-noise ratio of the reconstructed image.
Let L0 denote the code-stream data needed to form a layer 0 image, and Ll be the additional data
required to form a layer l image given L0, L1, . . . , Ll−1, l = 1, 2, . . . , nL − 1. In other words, a layer l
image is constructed by {L0, L1, . . . , Ll−1, Ll }. Ll is referred to as layer-increment l . The layer nL − 1
image is the original image given that the total number of layers of the image is nL.
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Precinct. To facilitate accessing certain portions such as ROI of an image (i.e., locality for accessing),
JPEG2000 provides an intermediate space-frequency structure known as a precinct. In particular, a
precinct is a collection of spatially contiguous code blocks from all subbands at a particular resolution. It
is important to note that unlike the tile and code-block partitions, the precinct partition does not affect
the transformation or coding of the sample data, and it helps in organizing compressed data within a
code-stream.
Packet. Packet is the most fundamental building block in a JPEG2000 code-stream. A data packet
comprises the compressed bit-stream from code blocks belonging to a specific component, resolution,
layer, and precinct.
Progression order. Progressive display allows an image to be reconstructed with increasing pixel
quality or resolution for different target devices. JPEG2000 supports progression in four dimensions:
layer (L), resolution (R), precinct (P ), and component (C). These dimensions of progression can be
mixed and matched within a single code-stream. The JPEG2000 standard defines five progression
orders: LRCP, RLCP, RPCL, PCRL, and CPRL. It is very important to know that a packet in a code-
stream uniquely corresponds to a layer-increment l , resolution-increment r, component c, and precinct
p.
5.1.2 Method. We apply the idea of the optimized scheme—using the Merkle hash tree—to the
authentication of JPEG2000 code-streams, and our method is built upon the authentication schemes
in Deng et al. [2005, 2004]. To keep our presentation neat and without losing generality, we consider
a code-stream that has one title and one component. As such, the code-stream comprises a set of
resolution-increments {Rr : r = 0, 1, . . . , nR − 1}, a set of layer-increments {Ll : l = 0, 1, 2, . . . , nL − 1},
and a set of precincts {Pp : p = 0, 1, 2, . . . , nP − 1}.
From this, JPEG2000 inherently supports different image sizes and image qualities controlled by
resolutions and layers, respectively. This feature provides a natural way to downgrade JPEG2000
images based on resolutions and layers. We observe that in the context of server-proxy-user systems,
a downgrading strategy based on resolutions or followed by layers may be the most likely strategy.
Hence we only consider content downscaling based on resolutions. Generalization to other strategies is
straightforward.
One of our main concerns is to minimize the amount of auxiliary authentication information AAI in
case of content downscaling by the intermediary proxy. To achieve this, we should place the nodes that
correspond to resolution-increments as high as possible along the Merkle hash tree. Figure 3 shows an
example of organizing the Merkle hash tree following the order of resolutions, layers, and precincts.
Recall that a packet uniquely corresponds to a resolution, a layer, and a precinct. So the path from
the root to a leaf node in Figure 3 identifies a packet. For example, the leftmost path is specified by
resolution-increment 0 (R0), layer-increment 0 (L0), and precinct 0 (P0). Thus the value of the leaf node
of this path is the hash value of the packet corresponding to R0, L0, and P0. As an example, let us
suppose the intermediary proxy downscales the image to the resolution 0 image, then AAI contains
only the hash value represented by node R1. It turns out that the Merkle hash tree in Figure 3 yields
the smallest amount of auxiliary authentication information under the resolution-based downscaling
strategy.
What remains to consider is how to accommodate transcoding operations of content alteration. This
depends on the way the intermediary proxy is expected to modify an image. For example, if the inter-
mediary proxy is expected to modify content involving all layers except layer 0, then the hash values
corresponding to nodes L1 (shaded nodes in Figure 3) are computed by applying the trapdoor hash func-
tion while all other nodes are computed using the standard hash function. This allows the intermediary
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Fig. 3. Organizing the Merkle hash tree following the order of resolutions, layers, and precincts.
proxy to modify any number of the leaf nodes rooted at L1s’ while keeping the original hash values of
L1s unchanged (to find collisions). It is clear that to achieve the same objective, we can instead apply
the trapdoor hash function to the leaf nodes of the subtrees rooted at L1s, while using the standard
hash function on all the remaining nodes. Note however that the trapdoor hash function is much more
expensive than the standard hash function, thus the latter alternative is undesirable. For efficiency
considerations, it is wise to avoid using the trapdoor hash function on individual leaf nodes, and it
seems that in JPEG2000, content alteration often affects the data at higher levels, such as resolution
and layer. As such, an important distinction in authentication of JPEG2000 code-streams from the
construction for generic data modality is that the use of the trapdoor hash function is not necessarily
at the level of the leaf nodes of the Merkle hash tree, and this clearly does not compromise security.
5.2 Authentication of MPEG-4 Video Streams
For ease of understanding, we first brief the structural semantics of MPEG4 video streams, and refer
interested readers to [ISO/IEC14496-1:2001 ] for more details. An MPEG-4 video sequence or group (VS)
comprises a series of video objects (VOs). Each VO is encoded in one or more video layers (VOLs). Each
VOL contains a sequence of 2D representations of arbitrary shapes at different time intervals, which is
referred to as a video object plane (VOP). The information contained in each layer corresponds to a given
level of temporal and spatial resolutions, making scalable transmission and storage possible. Each VOP
is divided into macroblocks (MB) of size 16 × 16, and each MB is encoded into 6 blocks, B1, . . . , B6, of
size 8 × 8 in the case of 4:2:0 format. Moreover, in an MPEG-4 stream, video objects such as foreground
objects and background objects can be assigned different priorities, known as visual object priority,
valued 1 ∼ 7 from lowest priority to highest; similarly, object layers have visual object layer priorities
indicating the differing importance of layers. The layer with the highest priority, called the base layer,
contains the most important features of the video sequence, while each additional layer, known as an
enhancement layer, serves to further enhance the quality of the base layer.
Clearly, MPEG-4 provides a natural way for transcoding operations such as content downscaling
and content alteration according to video objects and video object layers in the context of server-proxy-
user systems. Based on this, we organize, in Figure 4, a Merkle hash tree in order to authenticate an
MPEG-4 video stream that contains nO video object, each video object includes nL video object layers,
each video object layer has nP video object planes, and each video object plan has nM macroblocks.
Content downscaling can be readily accomplished on the level of video objects or video object layers.
For example, it is very easy for the intermediary proxy to drop some less important video objects while
yielding a minimized amount of auxiliary authentication information AAI. Also, the intermediary proxy
can easily perform transcoding operations of content alteration based on video objects and video objects
layers, in which cases the hash values corresponding to the affected VOs or VOLs in the Merkle hash
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Fig. 4. The Merkle hash tree for authentication of MPEG-4 video streams.
Table I. Experiment Results
Downscaling 1-Block Alteration 2-Block Alteration
Proxy side 0.42 ms 29.5 ms 59.6 ms
Server side 82.7 ms
User side 70.1 ms
tress should be computed using the trapdoor hash function while other nodes use the standard hash
function.
6. EXPERIMENT RESULTS
To evaluate the performance of our construction, we implemented a prototype of the server-proxy-user
architecture, which consists of three modules: a server module, a proxy module, and a user module.
Implementation is done on a PC with an Intel P4 2.4Ghz processor, 1.00 GB RAM, and the source code
is written in Microsoft C++. We instantiated the regular hash function and the digital signature scheme
by SHA-1 and 1024-bit RSA, respectively. For the trapdoor hash function, we choose the prime number
p to be 1024 bits and use 5 as the generator g . Note that to measure the worst-case performance, we
did not make optimizations even where it is possible, for example, computation of ye g δ mod p could
be optimized to compute a single exponentiation by leveraging the techniques in Dimitrov et al. [2000].
We first tested our construction (the Merkle hash tree construction) on generic data content. In
particular, 16 message blocks (each is 5KB) are organized into a Merkle hash tree, among which 2
blocks are trapdoor hashed and expected to be altered. We list the experimental results in Table I,
where the digits are averaged over 500 runs. The “downscaling” column shows the result of experiments
involving only content downscaling; the “1-block alteration” column is the result of experiments where
only one block is altered, and the “2-block alteration” experiments involve altering both blocks. It can
be seen that the time to compute a collision for the trapdoor hash function is approximately 29 ms in
our implementation. We point out that the performance differences between the server and the user is
due to the different time taken for RSA signing and verification.
We also applied our implementation to test JPEG2000 images. The tested images we use have 1
tile, 3 components, 7 resolution levels for each tile-component, 16 precincts for each resolution level,
and 10 layers. The image size is about 200KB per image. We organize and hash images following the
strategy in Figure 3 (8 L1 nodes are trapdoor hashed). Our experimental results show that on the
average, the server module can generate signed images in about 278 ms, generating up to 720 KB
code-streams per second. The proxy module uses about 242 ms to compute collisions for a signed image,
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which suggests that the intermediary proxy performing transcoding operations does not degrade the
scalability offered by the server-proxy-user architecture. No experiments were performed on MPEG-4
video streams. However, authenticating a 700 KB per second data stream should suffice for many
MPEG-4 applications. Better yet, much higher rates scan be supported in authenticating actual streams,
because only a small portion of a stream is expected to be trapdoor-hashed. To summarize, we believe
that our scheme is unlikely to have serious efficiency problems for practical use.
7. CONCLUSIONS
The main challenge in achieving end-to-end authentication in server-proxy-user multimedia delivery
systems is that authorized transcoding operations performed by intermediary proxies will definitely
invalidate the digital signature generated by the multimedia server if a standard digital signature
is used. In this article, we systematically studied the authentication problem in this context: first, a
formal model for the problem was specified; then, a concrete construction upon generic data formality
was given, and its security was formally proven; finally, the generic construction was applied to the
authentication of specific multimedia formats, JPEG2000 code-streams and MPEG-4 video streams.
The experimental results showed that our construction is practical.
APPENDIX 1. PROOF OF THEOREM 1.
PROOF. We prove by contradiction, and the proof is based on Ateniese et al. [2005]. The basic idea
is: suppose there exists an efficient adversary breaking the security property of our construction, then
this adversary can be used to construct an efficient algorithm to break the underlying digital signature
scheme, the trapdoor hash function, or the regular hash function. The details are sketched in the
following.
Let χ be the intermediate value of a message m signed by the underlying signature scheme, σ =
SSKS (χ ). Consider an instance of the forging experiment in which A succeeds in computing a signature
σ on a new message m such that σ = SSKS (χ ). The instance must fall in at least one of the two cases:
Case 1. Every query mi Amade to the oracle OSKS resulted in signature σi = SSKS (χi) associated to the
intermediate value χi, which is distinct from the value χ for the successful forgery σ = SSKS (χ ).
Case 2. There is a query mi to OSKS such that the response σi equates σ = SSKS (χ ), but mi is distinct
from m.
Our proof distinguishes these two cases. In Case 1, we build an adversary B, which breaks the
underlying digital signature scheme. In its first phase, B generates a key pair (PKP , SKP ) for the
trapdoor hash function. It gives PKP to the adversary A, and uses SKP with the collision-finding
algorithm for the trapdoor hash function to emulate the oracle OSKP . B also emulates the oracle for
the regular hash function in a way stipulated in Bellare and Rogaway [1993]. In order to answer A’s
signature queries, B turns to its own signing oracle for the underlying digital signature scheme. When
A finishes computing σ , B outputs the corresponding χ for its choice of target message, and the whole
transcript of A’s execution as its state after the first phase.
In its second phase, B just reads σ from the state information from the first phase, and terminates
successfully whenever A succeeds, and the execution is an instance of case 1. B’s execution time is
t0 = t + QTH.tTH + Q H .tH , where t is the number of steps used by A, QTH is the number of queries to
the oracle for the trapdoor hash function, Q H is the number of queries to the oracle for the regular hash
function, tTH is the maximum running time that B takes to compute a collision of the trapdoor hash
function, and tH is the maximum running time that B takes to compute the regular hash function.
In Case 2, we build an adversary C to the trapdoor hash function or the regular hash function, fromA.
In its first phase, C generates a key pair (PKS , SKS) for the underlying digital signature scheme. It gives
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PKS to the adversary A, and uses SKS with the signing algorithm SSKS (.) to emulate the signing oracle
OSKS . To answerA’s transcoding queries, C turns to its own collision-finding oracle for the trapdoor hash
function and the oracle for the regular hash function. When A finishes computing σ , C retrieves the
value χ and compares it with the values χi that appear inA’s transcript of queries to the signing oracle.
Since we are in Case 2, there is at least one queried message mi that differs from m, but χi equates
χ . For simplicity, we assume no content removal is involved, and m and mi only differ in items upon
which either (a) the trapdoor hash function, or (b) the regular hash function is applied. In case (a), we
have th = THPKP (m, r) = THPKP (mi, ri), and C outputs (th, mi, ri) as its chosen value to seek collisions
against; in case (b), we have h = H(m) = H(mi), and C outputs (h, mi) to seek collisions against.
In its second phase, C just reads the values (m, th, r) or (m, h) from the transcript of A and outputs
them. Therefore C succeeds wheneverA succeeds andA’s execution is an instance of Case 2. C’s execution
time is t1 = t + Q S .tsign, where t is the number of steps used by A, Q S is the number of A’s queries
to the signing oracle, and tsign is the maximum number of steps executed by the underlying signing
algorithm, that C must perform to emulate the signing oracle.
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